Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring Defendants Who Possess Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child Pornography Victims by Boe, Ashleigh
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 86 Number 1 Article 6 
1-1-2010 
Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring Defendants Who Possess 
Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child 
Pornography Victims 
Ashleigh Boe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Boe, Ashleigh (2010) "Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring Defendants Who Possess Child 
Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child Pornography Victims," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 86 : 
No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol86/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
      
 
PUTTING A PRICE ON CHILD PORN: 
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS WHO POSSESS 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IMAGES TO PAY RESTITUTION 
TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY VICTIMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation section of the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 made it mandatory for federal courts 
to order restitution to victims of certain crimes.  The purpose of the statute 
is not being fulfilled, however, when courts hold there is no causal connec-
tion between defendants who possess pornographic images of children and 
the victims of child pornography.  This article argues defendants possessing 
child pornography images should be required to pay restitution to child 
pornography victims under the mandatory restitution statute.  Restitution is 
necessary in order to fully compensate victims of child pornography for 
their losses.  Part II of this article gives a brief overview of federal criminal 
restitution in order to give context to the mandatory restitution statute.  It 
also describes the statute and the elements of restitution to which child 
pornography victims are entitled under the statute.  Part III analyzes the 
definition of “victim” under the statute and discusses the causation issues 
that arise in defining a victim entitled to restitution under the statute.  Part 
IV describes a proposed amendment to the statute that would aid in 
eliminating controversy surrounding the causation issue.  Part V concludes 
with the statute’s impact on the North Dakota federal court system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal Judge Asks Prosecutors to Put a Price on Child Porn,1 Child 
Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution,2 and Attorney Shifts Focus to 
Target Child Porn,3 all recently published newspaper articles, illustrate the 
growing importance of holding defendants who possess child pornography 
images accountable to the victims by ordering the defendants to pay resti-
tution to the victims.  The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation 
and Other Abuse of Children section of the Violence Against Women Act 
of 1994 made it mandatory for federal courts to order restitution to victims 
of certain crimes.4  Congress enacted the mandatory restitution statute to 
formally recognize the need for victims of child pornography to be fully 
compensated for their losses.5  The purpose of the statute is not being 
fulfilled, however, when courts hold there is no causal connection between 
defendants who possess pornographic images of children and the victims of 
child pornography.6 
The express language of the statute clearly dictates that restitution shall 
be ordered to any “individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime 
under [the Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Chapter of 
Title 18].”7  Defendants who possess pornographic images of children 
continually harm the victims every time they view the images.8  Under the 
statute, the child depicted in the pornographic images is a victim, and the 
defendant convicted of possessing the images is required to pay restitution.9 
 
1. James Walsh, Federal Judge Asks Prosecutors to Put a Price on Child Porn, STAR 
TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.startribune.com/local/stpaul/80672902.html?page=1&c=y. 
2. John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, 
at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03offender.html?emc=eta1. 
3. Attorney Shifts Focus to Target Child Porn, THE FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), May 26, 2010, 
http://www.inforum.com/event/article/id/279876/group/homepage/. 
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(4)(A) (2010) (“The issuance of a restitution order under this section 
is mandatory.”). 
5. See id. § 2259(b)(1) (stating “[t]he order of restitution under this section shall direct the 
defendant to pay the victim . . . the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the 
court . . . .”). 
6. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
7. See § 2259(c) (defining the term “victim” as “the individual harmed as a result of a 
commission of a crime under this chapter . . . .”). 
8. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how the defendant causes the child to suffer by 
receiving and viewing the pornographic images, thus perpetuating the existence of the images and 
creating an economic incentive for creating and distributing the materials). 
9. See discussion infra Part III.A (defining “victim” under the mandatory restitution statute); 
see also Meg Garvin, How Current Restitution Law is Failing Victims in Child Abuse Image 
Cases, 12 NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST. 1, 23 (2010) (noting it is well-established that child 
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This article argues defendants possessing child pornography images 
should be required to pay restitution to child pornography victims under the 
mandatory restitution statute.10  Restitution is necessary in order to fully 
compensate victims of child pornography for their losses.11  Part II of this 
article gives a brief overview of federal criminal restitution in order to give 
context to the mandatory restitution statute.  It also describes the statute and 
the elements of restitution to which child pornography victims are entitled 
under the statute.  Part III analyzes the definition of “victim” under the 
statute and discusses the causation issues that arise in defining a victim 
entitled to restitution.  Recent court opinions examining the causal require-
ments of the statute are also discussed in this section.  Part IV describes a 
proposed amendment to the statute that would help eliminate some of the 
controversy regarding the causation issue.  Part V concludes with the 
statute’s impact on the North Dakota federal court system. 
II. FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
Federal criminal restitution is a relatively new area of law, especially 
with regard to compensating victims of child pornography.12  In order to 
fully understand the mandatory restitution statute, it is necessary to briefly 
describe the history of federal criminal restitution and the policy behind it.  
Part A of this section provides an overview of federal restitution statutes.  
This discussion is essential to a thorough understanding of § 2259 because 
of the similarities between other federal restitution statutes and § 2259.  Part 
B of this section describes the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual 
Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children statute and the elements of 
restitution to which child pornography victims are entitled. 
A. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION 
Federal criminal restitution has become an increasingly important 
issue, and legislatures continue to enact and amend restitution statutes in 
order to compensate victims of certain crimes.13  As the concept of federal 
criminal restitution has evolved, Congress has increasingly recognized 
 
victims depicted in child abuse images should receive restitution from the defendants who possess 
their images). 
10. See discussion infra Part III.C (stating that victims of child pornography cases are 
harmed by the defendant’s crimes and have a right to be compensated). 
11. § 2259(b)(1). 
12. See infra note 721 and accompanying text (describing that until recently, prosecutors had 
not sought restitution on behalf of child pornography victims). 
13. CATHARINE M. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION, §§ 1:1, 1:3, at 1, 3 
(2008). 
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victims’ interests.14  This increased recognition of victims’ interests has re-
sulted in broader statutory criteria and, as a result, stronger implementation 
by federal courts.15 
1. History of Federal Restitution Law 
The first federal restitution act, the Federal Probation Act, was enacted 
in 1925.16  Under the Act, restitution was only imposed as a condition of 
supervision.17  In 1982, legislatures enacted the Victim Witness Protection 
Act (VWPA) to allow courts to impose restitution as a separate component 
of the sentence.18  Restitution under the original VWPA was only discre-
tionary, directing courts to take into account the defendant’s ability to pay 
and the extent of the victim’s harm when ordering restitution.19  One of the 
best known portions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,20 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,21 recodified the VWPA and reaf-
firmed restitution as a separate component of the sentencing process.22 
In the 1990 case Hughey v. United States,23 the United States Supreme 
Court held that the VWPA allowed restitution only for harm caused by an 
offense of the conviction.24  After Hughey, Congress amended the VWPA 
to allow restitution to be included for a scheme, pattern, or conspiracy if an 
element of the offense.25  Parties could now agree to restitution to any 
extent, in any case.26  Furthermore, parties could agree that restitution be 
paid to persons other than the victims of the offense.27 
In 1992, Congress enacted the first mandatory restitution statute, the 
Child Support Recovery Act.28  This Act did not give courts discretion to 
determine whether restitution should be awarded; the Act required courts to 
order restitution in an amount equal to the total unpaid child support 
 
14. Id. § 1:2, at 2. 
15. Id. 
16. Pub. L. No. 68-596, 43 Stat. 1260 (1925), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 
2031 (1987). 
17. GOODWIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL RESTITUTION, supra note 13, § 1:2, at 2. 
18. See Victim Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664). 
19. Id. 
20. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). 
21. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-
3664). 
22. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1:3, at 3. 
23. 495 U.S. 411 (1990). 
24. Hughey, 495 U.S. at 413.  
25. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 1:3, at 3. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 340 (1992). 
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existing at the time of sentencing.29  Congress enacted further mandatory 
restitution statutes in 1994 under the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act.30  This Act ordered defendants to pay restitution for 
certain title 18 offenses, such as violence against women, exploitation of 
children, and telemarketing.31  The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
(MVRA) of 1996 greatly improved victim compensation by making resti-
tution mandatory for a number of federal crimes.32  The MVRA dictated 
that victims must be “directly and proximately” harmed by the offense of 
the conviction in order to be awarded restitution under the Act.33  The 
MVRA also required courts to compensate victims for the “full amount” of 
the victims’ losses.34  Even though a number of federal restitution statutes 
exist, the general purpose of all the restitution statutes remains the same.35  
The next section explores Congress’ purpose in enacting restitution statutes. 
2. Purpose of Federal Restitution Law 
The principal of restitution is an integral part of the criminal justice 
system.36  “Restitution” means restoring someone to the position occupied 
before a particular event took place.37  The purpose of restitution is to make 
a victim whole.38  Congress enacted federal criminal restitution statutes to 
improve the administration of justice by requiring federal criminal defen-
dants to pay full restitution to the identifiable victims of their crimes.39  It is 
essential to the criminal justice system that offenders be held accountable 
 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1992). 
30. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1904 (1994). 
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2248 (mandating restitution for sexual abuse crimes under §§ 2241-2245); 
§ 2259 (mandating restitution for sexual exploitation of children crimes under §§ 2251-2258); 
§ 2264 (mandating restitution for domestic violence crimes under §§ 2261-2262); § 2327 (man-
dating restitution for telemarketing crimes under §§ 1028-1029 and §§ 1341-1345). 
32. § 3663(a)(1)(A) (mandating restitution for most federal offenses in which there is a vic-
tim); § 3664(f)(1)(A) (mandating that restitution be for the “full” amount of the victims’ harms, 
regardless of the defendant’s financial experiences). 
33. § 3663(a)(2). 
34. § 3664(f)(1)(A). 
35. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the purposes of federal restitution law). 
36. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 2:1, at 12. 
37. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 416 (1990). 
38. United States v. Crandall, 525 F.3d 907, 916 (9th Cir. 2008). 
39. See S. Rep. No. 104-79, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925 (favor-
able report out of the Judiciary Committee on the Victims Justice Act of 1995, which became the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act); see also United States v. Reano, 298 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 
(10th Cir. 2002) (citing the legislative history of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act); United 
States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 (D. Utah 2004) (affirming the policy of federal 
criminal restitution); United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1330 (D. Utah 2004) 
(affirming the policy of federal criminal restitution). 
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for their actions.40  The Judiciary Committee, in enacting the MVRA, stated 
that justice cannot be served until full restitution is made to the victim of a 
crime.41 
The purpose of ordering a defendant to pay a monetary fine, often in 
addition to serving a prison sentence, forces an individual defendant to 
address the harm his crime has caused to the individual victims of his crime 
and to society.42  Victims, especially victims of child pornography, fre-
quently suffer both financial and emotional losses because they have to seek 
counseling or medical services for the rest of their lives.43  The federal 
government is responsible for requesting victim restitution and advocating 
victims’ interests.44  It is the federal government’s goal that federal crime 
victims receive the fullest possible restitution from criminal wrongdoers.45  
The federal government must work to achieve this goal while balancing 
both the resources available to assist the victims and the constitutional 
rights of the defendant.46  Congress also works to advocate victims’ inter-
ests by enacting legislation such as the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual 
Exploitation of Children statute in order to protect child pornography 
victims and compensate the victims for their losses.47  The next section 
describes the mandatory restitution statute for sexual exploitation of 
children crimes and the elements of restitution to which victims are entitled 
under the statute. 
B. MANDATORY RESTITUTION FOR SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 
OF CHILDREN 
The Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of 
Children statute makes restitution mandatory for any offense under chapter 
110 of the United States Code.48  Courts have continued to affirm the 
 
40. See S. Rep. No. 104-79, supra note 39, at 12. 
41. Id. 
42. Id.; see also H. Rep. No. 104-16, at 5 (1995). 
43. See United States’ Response Re: Mandatory Restitution For Victims of Persons Who 
Possess Child Pornography at 13, United States v. Cook, No. 4:08-cr-00024-RRB (D. Alaska July 
16, 2009) (citing to the child pornography victim’s psychological consultation where the psy-
chologist indicated that the victim would struggle with the effects of the abuse for the rest of her 
life and the victim would require weekly therapy and perhaps even inpatient treatment at times, 
throughout the course of her lifetime). 
44. See GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 17:22, at 549. 
45. 128 Cong.Rec. 27391 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). 
46. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990) (describing the policy behind the 
Victim Witness Protection Act). 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2010). 
48. § 2259(c).  Chapter 110 includes the following crimes:  sexual exploitation of children; 
selling or buying children; certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation 
of children; and certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography.  
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mandatory nature of restitution for crimes included in this chapter.49  His-
torically, most courts have imposed restitution under § 2259 in cases where 
the defendant sexually abused the child victim or participated in the pro-
duction of child pornography in which the child victim was depicted.50  
However, § 2259 applies to all of the offenses in chapter 110, regardless of 
whether a defendant personally participated in the sexual abuse, production, 
and initial distribution of child pornography.51  Restitution is mandatory as 
 
Id. §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A.  The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a) states, “[n]otwithstanding 
section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law, 
the court shall order restitution of any offense under this chapter.” § 2259(a) (emphasis added).  
Further, subsection (b) provides, “[t]he issuance of a restitution order under this section is 
mandatory.” § 2259(b)(4)(A). 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Scheidt, No. 1:07-CR-00293, 2010 WL 144837, at *2 (E.D. 
Cal. Jan. 11, 2010) (stating “it is clear that restitution is mandatory for any offense in [Chapter 
110]”); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 n.101 (D. Utah 2004) (noting that 
the court “shall order” restitution for offenses under Chapter 110, in a case in which defendant 
was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)); United States v. 
Searle, 65 Fed. Appx. 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating “18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides that a person 
convicted of sexual exploitation must pay restitution” (emphasis added)); United States v. Julian, 
242 F.3d 1245, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 2001) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2259 as the mandatory 
restitution for sexual exploitation crimes); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 964-65 (9th Cir. 
1999) (noting that § 2259 “requires a sentencing court to order a defendant convicted of a crime 
involving the sexual exploitation of children to pay restitution to the victim of that crime”); United 
States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3rd Cir. 1999) (noting that restitution was mandatory 
under § 2259). 
50. See United States v. Johnston, No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 2010 WL 1640933, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 
Apr. 6, 2010) (ordering the defendant to pay restitution under § 2259 totaling $1,662,930 for 
manufacturing child pornography); United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(upholding a $16,475 restitution order compensating eight victims for future expenses, including 
two years of counseling, alternative education programs, vocational training, and a case manage-
ment fee, in a case in which the defendant was convicted of producing child pornography and 
engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minors in foreign places); United States v. Estep, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d 763, 770-74 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (ordering $221,480.10 in restitution to three child victims 
of sexual abuse and exploitation); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1249 (D. Utah 
2004) (ordering the defendant to pay $79,968 to the victim in a case in which the defendant (the 
victim’s adoptive father) was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(a)); Searle, 65 Fed. Appx. at 346 (upholding a $17,582.85 restitution order compensating 
victims’ guardians for counseling, transportation to counseling expenses, the cost of remodeling 
their home to accommodate the victims, and some of the cost of a vehicle purchased when custody 
of the victims was transferred to the guardians, in a case in which the defendant was convicted of 
receiving and producing child pornography); United States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1247-48 
(10th Cir. 2001) (finding that child victims were entitled to restitution for past medical and 
counseling expenses, and future counseling or treatment costs in a case in which the defendant 
was convicted of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, and conspiracy to commit offense, or to 
defraud the United States); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding 
a $304,200 district court restitution order compensating the victim for the anticipated costs of 
future therapy in a case in which the victim’s father was convicted of improper sexual contact 
with his daughter); Laney, 189 F.3d at 964-67 (upholding a $60,000 restitution order in a case in 
which the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to sexually exploit children in violation of 
§§ 2251 and 2252, and distribution of visual depictions of minors); Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125-26 
(upholding a $57,050.96 restitution order compensating the victim for medical expenses in a case 
in which the defendant was convicted of receiving child pornography in violation of § 2252(a)(2), 
but facts showed the defendant also participated in the production of the images). 
51. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), (a)(4) (2010). 
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a matter of law in cases involving the possession and distribution of images 
depicting the sexual abuse of minors.52  If a defendant is convicted of a 
crime under chapter 110, a court shall order the defendant to pay the victim 
“the full amount of the victim’s losses.”53  The term “full amount of the 
victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for: medical 
services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; physical 
and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; necessary transportation, 
temporary housing, and child care expenses; lost income; attorney’s fees, as 
well as other costs incurred; and any other losses suffered by the victim as a 
proximate result of the offense.54  This section next explores the six 
categories of “losses” for which child pornography victims are entitled to 
restitution under § 2259.  The frequency in which courts order restitution 
awards for each of these categories is also discussed. 
1. Medical Services Relating to Physical, Psychiatric, or 
Psychological Care 
Offenders who are convicted of a crime under chapter 110 are required 
to pay restitution to the victim for any of the victim’s costs incurred for 
medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care.55  
Courts have upheld strong and broad restitution orders for medical services 
when the costs are ascertainable at the time of sentencing.56  In United 
States v. Crandon,57 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a restitution 
award under § 2259 for psychiatric care where the defendant was convicted 
of molesting a fourteen-year-old victim whom the defendant had met on the 
Internet.58 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Laney,59 upheld 
a restitution award for future psychological treatment and counseling for the 
victim and her family.60  The award of future medical services was an issue 
 
52. Id. § 2259(a). 
53. Id. § 2259(b)(1). 
54. Id. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(F). 
55. Id. § 2259(b)(3)(A). 
56. See United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding Congress man-
dated broad restitution for a minor victim following an offender’s conviction of federal sexual 
child exploitation and abuse offenses); see also United States v. Johnston, No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 
2010 WL 1640933, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2010) (stating Congress chose generous terms in an 
effort to fully compensate child victims for the care needed to address the long-term effects of 
their abuse). 
57. 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999). 
58. Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125-26. 
59. 189 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1999). 
60. Laney, 189 F.3d at 966. 
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of first impression for the Ninth Circuit in Laney.61  The defendant chal-
lenged the award for future medical services, claiming that § 2259 did not 
authorize compensation for amounts the victims have not yet spent.62  The 
Laney court dismissed the defendant’s argument and held that compen-
sation for future counseling expenses was proper where the cost of the 
counseling was ascertainable at the time of sentencing.63  In United States v. 
Danser,64 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the costs of future 
psychiatric therapy were ascertainable where the district court conducted a 
hearing that addressed the victim’s need for long-term counseling, and the 
victim’s treating psychologist provided figures to determine the weekly cost 
of counseling for the next seventy-five years.65 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Pearson,66 
using the same reasoning as the Ninth Circuit in Laney, and the Seventh 
Circuit in Danser, stated a restitution order pursuant to § 2259 might in-
clude an amount for future medical expenses.67  However, the district court 
had not adequately explained the restitution award for future medical 
expenses.68  Thus, the case was remanded to the district court for a more 
thorough explanation of the $974,902 restitution award.69  This long line of 
cases demonstrates that restitution can be awarded for both past and future 
medical expenses, as long as the costs are ascertainable at the time of 
sentencing.70 
2. Physical and Occupational Therapy or Rehabilitation 
Restitution for the cost of physical and occupational therapy or rehabil-
itation can also be awarded under § 2259.71  Recently, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, in United States v. 
Johnston,72 awarded restitution to the male and female victims for physical 
health care costs resulting from the defendant’s sexually abusive conduct.73  
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 967 n.14 (noting the cost of future counseling was ascertainable because the 
government’s estimate of the amount was well-supported and exact and the defendant did not 
contest it). 
64. 270 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2001). 
65. Danser, 270 F.3d at 455-56. 
66. 570 F.3d 480 (2d Cir. 2009). 
67. Pearson, 570 F.3d at 486. 
68. Id. at 487. 
69. Id. 
70. See cases cited supra notes 57-69. 
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(B) (2010). 
72. No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 2010 WL 1640933 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2010). 
73. Johnston, No. 7:09-CR-72-D, 2010 WL 1640933, at *4. 
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Typically, however, the government does not seek restitution under this 
element for child pornography victims because their losses are emotional 
rather than physical.74  If a victim requires restitution for physical therapy 
or rehabilitation, a court has the ability to authorize an award under 
§ 2259.75 
3. Necessary Transportation, Temporary Housing, and Child 
Care Expenses 
An offender may be required to compensate the victim, or the victim’s 
family, for transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses 
under § 2259.76  In United States v. Estep,77 the court held that restitution 
was owed to the mother of a child victim for the child’s transportation 
expenses to a new school.78  The court calculated the anticipated future cost 
of driving the child to school until the child was old enough to take the 
school bus to middle school.79  The Estep court held that the cost of trans-
portation was a proximate result of the defendant’s crimes, and thus the 
victim’s mother was entitled to restitution.80  Therefore, if the costs of 
transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses can be reason-
ably calculated, and are ascertainable at the time of sentencing, the court is 
required to award restitution for these costs pursuant to § 2259.81 
4. Lost Income 
Section 2259 requires the defendant to compensate the victim for 
income lost as a result of the offense.82  Lost income under the statute can 
be difficult to calculate for child victims because they have never been 
employed.  Any monetary figure presented would be a speculative calcula-
tion of income the victim might lose in the future.83  Restitution for future 
lost income represents a significant development in federal criminal 
 
74. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (noting many child pornography victims seek restitution 
for medical services relating to psychiatric or psychological care). 
75. § 2259(b)(3)(B). 
76. § 2259(b)(3)(C).  “Victims” includes the abused and exploited children and their 
guardians. § 2259(c). 
77. 378 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Ky. 2005). 
78. Estep, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 772. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. § 2259(b)(3)(C). 
82. § 2259(b)(3)(D). 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050, at 
*5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (illustrating the government’s evidence in possession cases is often 
an actuarial analysis containing a monetary figure of what the victim’s lost future income would 
likely be). 
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restitution jurisprudence.84  Courts have frequently held that lost future 
income cannot be awarded to the victim if the costs are unascertainable at 
the time of sentencing.85  Because very few courts have analyzed the 
question of future lost income in the context of restitution to the victim of a 
child exploitation offense, it is helpful to review such claims under a 
primary restitution statute such as the MVRA.86 
In United States v. Oslund,87 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
the MVRA did not distinguish between past and future income.88  The 
Oslund court stated “because future income is income that is lost to the 
victim as a direct result of the crime, the plain language of the statute leads 
to the conclusion that lost future income can be included in a restitution 
order.”89  However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States 
v. Fountain,90 held that because the term “future” was not in the statute, “an 
order requiring a calculation of lost future earnings unduly complicates the 
sentencing process and is thus not authorized.”91  Other circuits analyzing 
future lost income awards under federal restitution statutes have held that 
restitution may be awarded for lost future income.92  These cases illustrate 
 
84. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 13, § 7:18 (“[Restitution for future lost income] represents 
one of the most expansive new areas of authorized restitution under the restitutions statutes, for a 
non-listed harm.  This is particularly remarkable because future lost income is historically a 
distinctively civil kind of damage, or remedy.”). 
85. See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 801-02 (7th Cir. 1985) (reversing a 
restitution award, granted under a different restitution statute that compensated for an injured 
victim’s lost future wages).  “[T]he difficult[y] . . . of translating an uncertain future stream of 
earnings into a present value” means that “projecting lost future earnings has no place in criminal 
sentencing if the amount or present value of those earnings is in dispute.” Id. 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to 
order restitution for future lost wages and suggesting that “an order of restitution for future losses 
may be inappropriate because the amount of loss is too difficult to confirm or calculate.” (citing 
Fountain, 768 F.2d at 801-02 )); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 n.5 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(distinguishing future counseling expenses from future earnings and suggesting the mental trauma 
the victim suffered resulted in a loss that had been incurred and that “will continue to manifest 
itself for years,” as opposed to compensation for future wages that had not yet been earned). 
87. 453 F.3d 1048 (8th Cir. 2006). 
88. Oslund, 453 F.3d at 1062-63. 
89. Id. 
90. 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985). 
91. Fountain, 768 F.2d at 801-02. 
92. See United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding the 
district court properly exercised its “abundant discretion” when it ordered restitution under the 
MVRA for future lost income to the estate of a three-month-old homicide victim); United States v. 
Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating “[t]he plain language of the MVRA 
contemplates an award of restitution to the victim’s estate for future lost income and certainly 
does not expressly exclude such an award.”); see also United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 
1291-92 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding an estimate of loss relating to income and earning potential is 
sufficient for a restitution order, where exact loss is impossible to determine); United States v. 
Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (awarding future lost income under the VWPA to 
a fire department in an arson-homicide case); United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1146 
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that restitution can be awarded for past and future lost income, provided the 
monetary figure is not speculative and the costs are ascertainable at the time 
of sentencing.93 
5. Attorney’s Fees, As Well As Other Costs Incurred 
A victim can be compensated for attorney’s fees as well as other costs 
incurred under § 2259.94  If a court finds that a victim was harmed as a 
result of the defendant’s conduct and is entitled to restitution, the court will 
likely award attorney’s fees to the victim.95  The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in United States v. Hicks,96 re-
cently awarded attorney’s fees as part of a restitution award to a child por-
nography victim reasoning that § 2259 requires the victim to be compen-
sated for the “full amount of their losses.”97  Thus, courts must order 
attorney’s fees to the victims to fully compensate them for their losses.98 
6. Any Other Losses Suffered by the Victim as a Proximate 
Result of the Offense 
Section 2259 contains a “catch-all” provision stating the victim can be 
compensated for any other losses incurred by the victim as a proximate 
result of the offense not specifically listed in the statute.99  The phrase “any 
other losses” could potentially include claims for pain and suffering or loss 
of enjoyment of life, the claims typically awarded in the context of civil 
cases.100  However, courts generally do not include pain and suffering or 
 
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming an order granting victim’s widow $100,000 in restitution under the 
VWPA, based on lost income). 
93. See United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting “an order of 
restitution for future losses may be inappropriate because the amount of loss is too difficult to 
confirm or calculate”). 
94. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(E) (2010). 
95. See United States v. Estep, 378 F. Supp. 2d 763, 774 (E.D. Ky. 2005) (holding attorney’s 
fees could be included in a restitution award where, even though the attorney was also repre-
senting the victims in a civil case, the costs were clearly on behalf of the victims). 
96. No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260 (E.D. Va. Nov. 29, 2009). 
97. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *5; see § 2259(b)(1). 
98. § 2259(b)(3). 
99. § 2259(b)(3)(F). 
100. See United States v. Chalupnik, 514 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2008)  (“While the avail-
ability of a civil remedy is relevant in determining who is an MVRA victim, the amount of resti-
tution that may be awarded is limited to the victim’s provable actual loss, even if more punitive 
remedies would be available in a civil action.”); United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1128 
(10th Cir. 2007) (concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by treating a restitution 
analysis in a criminal case differently that an award of damages in a civil case); United States v. 
Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 618-19 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting restitution “is less generous than common law 
damages . . . .  This distinction is consistent with the historic distinction between restitution and 
damages, the former originally referring to the restoration of something that the defendant had 
taken from the plaintiff”); United States v. Havens, 424 F.3d 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A civil 
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loss of enjoyment of life awards in restitution orders because such damages 
are not based on “actual loss.”101  In United States v. Petruk,102 the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals looked to congressional intent when it held restitu-
tion was a compensatory remedy and victims should be limited to compen-
sation for their actual losses.103  Other circuits have also held the victim’s 
losses must be actual and not consequential or incidental.104  Thus, because 
courts are not inclined to order restitution when the victim’s losses are too 
speculative, it is unlikely this “catch-all” category will often be utilized for 
seeking restitution for other losses, such as pain and suffering or loss of 
enjoyment of life.105  Congress included this sixth category of loss to keep 
restitution broad under § 2259; as a result, courts have discretion to order 
restitution for other losses not specifically listed in the statute if the defen-
dant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the victim’s loss.106 
III. WHO IS ENTITLED TO RESTITUTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 2259? 
Until recently, prosecutors had not sought restitution in criminal cases 
where a defendant was convicted of possessing child pornography im-
ages.107  Previously, the offenders who were ordered to pay restitution 
under § 2259 were those offenders who had produced pornographic images 
of children.108  Now, victims are asking courts to require defendants who 
 
judgment award by itself, however, is insufficient to support an order of restitution because some 
damages and costs recoverable in a civil action, such as treble damages, consequential damages, 
and attorneys’ fees spent in pursuing litigation against the wrongdoer, do not qualify as losses 
under the MVRA.”). 
101. Serawop, 505 F.3d at 1124 (stating “the MVRA does not provide incidental, 
consequential, or pain and suffering awards.”). 
102. 484 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2007). 
103. Petruk, 484 F.3d at 1038. 
104. See United States v. Rhodes, 330 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that under the 
MVRA, “the statute implicitly requires that the restitution award be based on the amount of loss 
actually caused by the defendant’s offense”); United States v. Barton, 366 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (providing “there is general agreement that a restitution order under the MVRA cannot 
encompass consequential damages resulting from the defendant’s conduct.”); United States v. 
Seward, 272 F.3d 831, 839 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding restitution is based on the amount of actual 
loss caused by the offense, and excludes consequential or incidental damages). 
105. See discussion supra Part II.B.4 (discussing how courts are reluctant to order restitution 
when the monetary figure is speculative or too difficult to ascertain). 
106. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’ intent to include broad 
restitution under the Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Act); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2259(b)(3)(F) (2010). 
107. See United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 790 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2009) 
(providing “[r]estitution in possession cases is an issue of first impression in district courts around 
the nation as the Government has only recently begun seeking restitution from possessors of child 
pornography on behalf of victims.”); see also United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-cr-00165-WWE 
(D. Conn. Feb.23, 2009) (being one of the first district courts to hold that a defendant convicted of 
possessing, but not creating, illegal images of child pornography, pay restitution to a victim). 
108. Paroline, No. 6:08-CR-61, 2009 WL 4572786, at *7. 
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possess pornographic images of the victims to pay restitution.109  This de-
velopment has presented difficult questions to courts.  How is “victim” 
defined under § 2259?  If a child pornography victim is a victim under the 
statute, is the victim harmed as a result of the defendant’s possession of the 
victim’s images?  Furthermore, if the victim is harmed, is the harm com-
pensable under § 2259?  Courts are divided on how to answer these ques-
tions.  Part A of this section defines the term “victim” under § 2259, Part B 
examines whether the statute imposes a proximate cause requirement, and 
Part C analyzes whether a child pornography victim is harmed when a 
defendant possesses pornographic images of the victim.  Part C also 
addresses whether, if the victim is harmed, the harm is compensable under 
§ 2259. 
A. DEFINING “VICTIM”:  THE CAUSATION CONTROVERSY 
Section 2259 broadly defines “victim” as an “individual harmed as a 
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.”110  Congress defined 
“harm” liberally in § 2259 in order to protect children victimized by child 
pornography.111  Significantly, Congress has used a much narrower defini-
tion of victim in other crime victim restitution statutes, for example, that the 
“victim” be a “person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the 
commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered . . . .”112  
The words “directly and proximately” do not appear in § 2259, indicating 
the harm a person must suffer to be a victim of a child pornography offense 
need not be “direct” nor “proximate” in order to qualify for victim status.113  
Thus, the plain language of the statue indicates that any kind of “harm” is 
sufficient to create victim status for purposes of § 2259.114  Despite the 
plain language of the statute, not all courts agree a victim of an offender 
who possesses pornographic images of the victim is a victim entitled to 
 
109. Id. 
110. § 2259(c) (emphasis added); see supra note 48 (discussing the crimes listed under 
chapter 110, specifically including crimes related to child pornography). 
111. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995:  Hearing on S. 1237 Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (“Protecting our children from abuse and exploitation at the hands of a stranger or a 
neighbor or a trusted adult, or some cases a family member, is one of the most important duties of 
our criminal justice system.”). 
112. § 3663(a)(2) (emphasis added); accord § 3663A(a)(2) (using identical language). 
113. See § 2259(c) (interpreting the plain language of the statute). 
114. Brief of the National Crime Victim Law Institute et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of 
Restitution for Amy and Other Victims of Child Pornography at 4, United States v. Paroline, 672 
F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
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restitution under § 2259.115  Some courts have held there is a proximate 
cause requirement between the victim’s losses and the particular defen-
dant’s conduct.116 
B. DOES THE STATUTE IMPOSE A PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT? 
Section 2259 provides that restitution is available for the “full amount 
of the victim’s losses.”117  For five of the six categories of losses recognized 
in § 2259, there is no proximate cause requirement.  For the sixth “catch-
all” category, a proximate cause requirement exists.  Section 2259 promises 
victims of child pornography offenses that the court “shall direct the 
defendant to pay the victim [through the appropriate court mechanism] the 
full amount of the victim’s losses . . . .”118  The statute goes on to provide 
six categories of damages, only one of which contains a proximate cause 
requirement: 
(3) Definition.—For purposes of this subsection, the term “full 
amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the 
victim for— 
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or 
psychological care; 
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child 
care expenses; 
(D) lost income; 
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and 
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate 
result of the offense.119 
As the plain language of the statute indicates, a victim need only show 
various losses were the “proximate result” of the offense when seeking 
restitution under subsection (b)(3)(F).120  There is no language regarding a 
“proximate” connection under the first five categories of losses.121  Accord-
ingly, it can be presumed Congress acted intentionally and purposely in the 
 
115. See, e.g., United States v. Van Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 498050, at 
*5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009) (denying restitution to child pornography victim). 
116. Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.B. 
117. § 2259(b)(1). 
118. Id. 
119. § 2259(b)(3) (emphasis added); see discussion supra Parts II.B.1-6 (discussing the six 
categories of damages and the amount of restitution the victim is entitled to under each category). 
120. § 2259(b)(3)(F). 
121. § 2259(b)(3)(A)-(E). 
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disparate inclusion or exclusion of the proximate result language.122  
However, many courts that have analyzed restitution claims under § 2259 
have concluded the United States must show the victim was harmed as a 
proximate cause of the offense of the conviction.123 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Paroline,124 
declined to order restitution pursuant to § 2259 because the government 
failed to show the victim’s losses were proximately caused by the defen-
dant’s possession of the victim’s images.125  The Paroline court upheld the 
district court’s interpretation of § 2259 as including a proximate cause 
requirement for each category of loss under the statute.126  The district court 
reasoned the United States Supreme Court has held “[w]hen several words 
are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other 
words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that 
the clause be read as applicable to all.”127  Based on this authority, the court 
held the phrase “as a proximate result of the offense” would apply equally 
to all the loss categories in § 2259.128  To construe the statute otherwise, the 
court reasoned, would likely violate the Eighth Amendment.129  The court 
 
122. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 
123. See United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding § 2259 incor-
porates a requirement of proximate causation); see, e.g., United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 
1160 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Raplinger, No. 05-CR-49-LRR, 2007 WL 3285802 (N.D. 
Iowa Oct. 9, 2007); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (10th Cir. 1999).  This interpret-
tation is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of a pre-MVRA statute, 
which permitted the district courts to order restitution “in the case of an offense resulting in 
[harm]” to the victim—language similar to 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c).  Hughey v. United States, 495 
U.S. 411, 418-20 n.3 (1990) (citation omitted).  In Hughey, the court confirmed the necessity of a 
causal nexus between the offense and the harm to the victim and held that “the loss caused by the 
conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution order.” Id. 
at 420.  However, when the offense of conviction is scheme or conspiracy, the victim is entitled to 
restitution resulting from harms caused by the defendant’s individual actions, as well as harms 
caused by others involved in the scheme or conspiracy. Laney, 189 F.3d at 965; United States v. 
Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Theodore, 354 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 
2003); United States v. Grice, 319 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Newsome, 
322 F.3d 328, 342 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ross, 210 F.3d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Jackson, 155 F.3d 942, 949 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 
181, 185 (10th Cir. 1993). 
124. 672 F. Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
125. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 793. 
126. Id. at 791. 
127. Id. at 788 (citing Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920)). 
128. Id.; see also United States v. Berk, No. 08-CR-212-P-S, 2009 WL 3451085, at *5 
(D.Me. Oct. 29, 2009) (stating “the natural construction of [§ 2259] demands that the proximate 
cause requirement be read as applicable to every class of loss set forth in the statute.”). 
129. Id. at 789 (holding a restitution award not limited to losses proximately caused by the 
defendant’s conduct would most likely violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
excessive fines). 
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noted, however, that determining a restitution award under § 2259 is an 
“inexact science” not requiring mathematical precision.130 
Recently, in United States v. Hardy,131 the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania held that § 2259 imposes a proximate 
cause requirement in a case where the defendant was convicted and ordered 
to pay restitution for possessing child pornography images.132  Both the 
government and the defendant in Hardy agreed there was a proximate cause 
requirement; however, each would have had the court apply the proximate 
cause requirement differently.133  Courts are simply unclear on how to 
interpret the plain language of the statute and, as a result, are either award-
ing smaller restitution awards than mandated by the statute or no restitution 
awards at all.134 
When courts hold restitution cannot be awarded to victims of defen-
dants who possess pornographic images of the victims, courts are ignoring 
both the plain language of the mandatory restitution statute and the 
congressional intent behind it.135  To hold that a defendant who possessed 
pornographic images of a child did not harm the child constitutes “clear and 
indisputable error.”136  Congress mandated broad restitution for a minor 
victim following an offender’s conviction of federal child sexual exploita-
tion offenses.137 
Courts are needlessly opining as to the correct causation standard under 
the statute.138  The plain language of the statute dictates mandatory 
restitution to “any individual harmed as a result [of a child pornography 
 
130. Id. at 791-92; see United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2007); see 
also United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455-56 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that mathematical 
precision is not required in the causal analysis upholding a restitution award of $304, 200); United 
States v. Julian, 242 F.3d 1245, 1247 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that in contexts involving awards 
to child victims of sexual exploitation, a district court has significant discretion to make a reason-
able estimate of an amount that reflects the full loss to the victim); United States v. Crandon, 173 
F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding a restitution award under § 2259 calculated by the district 
court using “reasonable certainty”). 
131. No. 09-151, 2010 WL 1543844 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2010). 
132. Hardy, No. 09-151, 2010 WL 1543844, at *7. 
133. Id.  
134. See id. at *8 (stating “[i]n context, the phrases ‘as a result of’ and ‘as a proximate result 
of’ are unclear.”).  “The boundaries of proximate cause are murky.” Id. at *13. 
135. United States v. Paroline, 672 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (Dennis, J., 
dissenting). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
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crime].”139  As explained below, when a defendant possesses pornographic 
images of a child, the defendant is clearly causing the victim harm.140 
C. HOW VICTIMS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION CASES 
ARE HARMED BY DEFENDANTS’ CRIMES 
More than twenty-seven years ago, in New York v. Ferber,141 the 
United States Supreme Court noted that “the use of children as subjects of 
pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and 
mental health of the child.”142  Specifically, sexually exploited children 
have difficulty developing healthy relationships later in life and are more 
likely to become sexual abusers as adults.143  When the abuse is recorded 
and distributed, the child’s privacy interests are invaded as well.144  The 
Ferber court also observed that the “materials produced are a permanent 
record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is exacer-
bated by their circulation.”145  The court continued: 
[P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than 
does sexual abuse or prostitution.  Because the child’s actions are 
reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future 
years, long after the original misdeed took place.  A child who has 
posed for a camera must go through life knowing that the record-
ing is circulating within the mass distribution system for child 
pornography. . . .  [I]t is the fear of exposure and the tension of 
keeping the act secret that seem to have the most profound 
emotional repercussions.146 
In Ferber, the United States Supreme Court clearly illustrated that 
defendants who possess pornographic images continually harm the child 
victim by viewing and keeping the images in circulation.147 
 
139. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (2010). 
140. See discussion infra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are harmed 
by the defendants’ crimes). 
141. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
142. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
143. Id. at 758 n.9. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 759 (emphasis added). 
146. Id. at 759 n.10 (citing David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of 
Children:  A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)); Christopher T. Donnelly, 
Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography:  Toward Constitutional and Enforceable 
Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 301(1979); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 
109-10 (1990) (reaffirming the Ferber holding in a case involving possession of child 
pornography). 
147. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. 
       
224 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:205 
Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court again acknowledged the 
harm to victims depicted in child pornography, and observed that a new 
harm was caused each time the images were shared with someone differ-
ent.148  The appellate courts have held in numerous cases that the children 
depicted in pornographic materials are victims harmed by the possession, 
receipt, distribution, and production of their images.149  The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Norris,150 rejected the defendant’s 
argument that receiving child pornography was a victimless crime, and that 
the children depicted in child pornography could only be victims in an 
indirect sense.151  The Norris court noted that the “victimization of the 
children involved does not end when the pornographer’s camera is put 
away.”152  The consumers, or end recipients, of pornographic material cause 
the children depicted in those materials to suffer as a result of their actions 
in at least three ways: 
First, the simple fact that the images have been disseminated 
perpetuates the abuse initiated by the producer of the materials.  
[T]he materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s 
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their 
circulation.  The consumer who “merely” or “passively” receives 
or possesses child pornography directly contributes to this con-
tinuing victimization. 
Second, the mere existence of child pornography represents an 
invasion of the privacy of the child depicted.  Both the Supreme 
Court and Congress have explicitly acknowledged that the child 
victims of child pornography are directly harmed by this despi-
cable intrusion on the lives of the young and the innocent.  The 
recipient of child pornography obviously perpetuates the existence 
 
148. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2005) (noting “as a permanent 
record of a child’s abuse, the continued circulation itself would harm the child who had 
participated.  Like a defamatory statement, each new publication of the speech would cause new 
injury to the child’s reputation and emotional well-being.” (emphasis added)). 
149. See cases cited supra note 123 (providing examples of cases where courts of appeals 
have held that victims are harmed by the defendant’s possession of pornographic images); see also 
United States v. Freeman, Case No. 3:08-CR-22-002 (N.D. Fla. July 9, 2009); United States v. 
Staples, Case No. 2:09-CR-14017 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2009).  In reaching its decision that a 
conviction for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is a crime 
involving moral turpitude, the Ninth Circuit found that child pornography causes continuing 
“injury to a child’s reputation and well-being.”  United States v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894, 897 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“Because possession of child pornography offends conventional morality and visits 
continuing injury on children, it is vile, base or depraved and . . . violates societal moral stan-
dards.” (citation omitted, emphasis added)). 
150. 159 F.3d 926 (5th Cir. 1998). 
151. Norris, 159 F.3d at 929. 
152. Id. 
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of the images received, and therefore the recipient may be con-
sidered to be invading the privacy of the children depicted, directly 
victimizing these children. 
Third, the consumer of child pornography instigates the original 
production of child pornography by providing an economic motive 
for creating and distributing the materials . . . .  [T]here is no sense 
in distinguishing, as Norris has done, between the producers and 
the consumers of child pornography.  Neither could exist without 
the other.  The consumers of child pornography therefore victimize 
the children depicted in child pornography by enabling and sup-
porting the continued production of child pornography, which en-
tails continuous direct abuse and victimization of child subjects.153 
Congress has also long recognized the harm inflicted on victims of 
child pornography.154  In the legislative history of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996, Congress noted that the physiological, emotional, 
and mental health of a child who was used as the subject of pornographic 
material was harmed.155  More recently, Congress again addressed the 
impact of child pornography in the legislative history behind the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.156  Congress found that: 
[T]he illegal production, transportation, distribution, receipt, 
advertising and possession of child pornography, as defined in 
section 2256(8) of title 18, United States Code . . . is harmful to 
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the children 
depicted in child pornography and has a substantial and detri-
mental effect on society as a whole . . . .  Every instance of view-
ing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of 
the privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.157 
In addition to the courts’ and Congress’ recognition of the long-term 
harms associated with child pornography, the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children sponsored a study that looked into arrested offend-
ers who possessed child pornography.158  The study revealed individuals 
 
153. Id. at 929-30 (quotations omitted). 
154. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 14 (1996) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 
(1982)). 
155. Id. 
156. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501, 120 
Stat. 587, 623 (2006). 
157. Id. 
158. Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on Issues of Restitution 
for Victims of Child Pornography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 at 6, United States v. Paroline, 672 F. 
Supp. 2d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2009). 
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possessing child pornography images added to the lasting burden of child 
victims.159  The victims know their pictures are circulating on the Internet 
and are perpetually victimized by the continued circulation and possession 
of their images.160  For the foregoing reasons, victims are clearly harmed as 
a result of the defendant’s possession of their images.  Therefore, courts 
need to order restitution to these victims.  The plain language of the statute 
and congressional intent mandates restitution to child pornography vic-
tims.161  The next section illustrates a proposed amendment to the manda-
tory restitution statute that would eliminate controversy surrounding the 
causation requirement of the statute. 
IV. ELIMINATING THE CAUSATION CONTROVERSY: 
A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO § 2259 
Federal courts around the nation are being called on to consider restitu-
tion awards under § 2259, and the courts are disagreeing as to the causation 
requirement under the statute.162  An amendment to § 2259 would likely 
eliminate controversy regarding the causation language in the statute.163  
Some courts have held that § 2259 requires the victims’ harm be a “proxi-
mate cause” of the defendant’s possession of their pornographic images.164  
Some courts have not addressed the causation issue at all,165 while others 
have found § 2259 requires that the victim’s harm lie somewhere in be-
tween “proximate cause” and general harm to the victim by the defendant’s 
possession of the victim’s images.166 
 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 7. 
161. See discussion supra Part III.B (analyzing the proximate cause requirement of § 2259). 
162. See infra notes 163-167 and accompanying text. 
163. See United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 
24, 2009) (“In surveying those of our sister districts which have grappled with requests for resti-
tution in similar cases, it is apparent that the issue of causation remains the most contested 
point.”); see also Garvin, supra note 9, at 1 (suggesting a court-based or legislative solution is 
needed in order to eliminate the varied interpretations of § 2259 and to avoid further harming 
child victims). 
164. See supra text accompanying note 123; see also United States v. Simon, 2009 WL 
2424673, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009) (stating “a restitution order in [an end-user possession] 
case must be based upon the identification of a specific injury to the victim that was caused by the 
specific conduct of the defendant.”). 
165. See United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. 
Sept. 2, 2009) (ordering a possessor criminal defendant to pay $3,680,153 in restitution to a victim 
without addressing the proximate causation issue). 
166. See Hicks, No. 1:09-CR-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009) (hold-
ing a restitution award was proper because the defendant’s actions presented a sufficiently 
“proximate tie” to the victims injuries).  The court also held § 2259 does not clearly demand a 
“proximate cause” standard. Id. at *3. 
       
2010] NOTE 227 
If Congress eliminated the “proximate result” language from category 
(F) of the statute, some courts would have a much weaker argument that 
categories (A) through (E) also require a proximate causation require-
ment.167  Courts continue to opine as to whether category (F) alone imposes 
the proximate causation language, or if the language is applicable to all the 
categories.168  Eliminating the language would force courts to look at the 
real issue in these cases:  defendants who possess pornographic images of 
children are harming the victims, and the victims deserve restitution.169  If 
the “proximate result” language did not exist in category (F), courts would 
have to define “victim” using the plain language of the statute, and “the 
term ‘victim’ would mean the individual harmed as a result of a commis-
sion of a crime under this chapter.”170 
Alternatively, Congress could amend the statute to include language 
indicating that for all the categories, the victim’s harms must be a proximate 
cause of the defendant’s conduct; language could also be added mandating 
this causal relationship be established upon a showing that the statutory 
definition of “victim” is met.171  In summary, because child pornography 
victims are harmed as a result of the defendant’s possession of their images, 
a restitution award is proper under the statute.172  Courts need to enforce the 
mandatory language of the statute and order restitution in all cases where 
victims can be identified.173  The specific process for amending the lan-
guage of the statute is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to 
note how a change would impact federal courts’ restitution holdings.  Con-
gress intended for the language of the statute to be broad in order to fully 
compensate child pornography victims for their losses.174  The impact of 
§ 2259 is far-reaching, and the next section describes the statute’s impact on 
the North Dakota federal court system. 
 
167. See United States v. Paroline, No. 6:08-CR-61, 2009 WL 4572786, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 
Dec. 7, 2009) (holding that the phrase “as a proximate result of the offense” would apply equally 
to all the loss categories in § 2259(b)(3) because the language is included in category (F)). 
168. Id. 
169. See discussion supra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are 
harmed by the defendants’ crimes). 
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c) (2010). 
171. See Garvin, supra note 9, at 23 (“A proper reading of Section 2259, together with prior 
court and Congressional findings on the harms that stem from possession, mandates that this 
causal relationship is sufficiently established upon a showing that the statutory definition of 
“victim” is met.”). 
172. See discussion supra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are 
harmed by the defendants’ crimes). 
173. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Robbing the Rich to Feed the Poor?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 261, 263 (1999) (stating courts should identify victims even when they are numerous and 
calculate harm even when such an analysis is complex). 
174. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (considering the purposes of federal restitution law). 
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V. IMPACT ON THE NORTH DAKOTA FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 
Although the mandatory restitution for sexual exploitation crimes of 
children was enacted in 1994, cases seeking a restitution order under this 
statute rarely appear in federal district courts.175  The reason is not that 
prosecution of child pornography offenders had decreased.176  In fact, 
prosecutions of child pornography cases have increased.177  So, why are 
restitution orders under § 2259 not increasing as well?  Simply put, 
prosecutors are not seeking the restitution orders.178 
Recently, a federal district court judge in St. Paul, Minnesota, issued an 
order demanding to know why restitution was not even requested by the 
United States Attorney’s Office in the case of a Minnesota man who 
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography.179  Judge Schilz stated 
restitution for child pornography victims must be considered and “[t]he 
Court will no longer accept silence.”180  The Department of Justice re-
sponded by stating “[t]his is an emerging issue and one we are looking at 
very closely.  We will seek restitution in those cases where we believe it is 
appropriate and authorized by law.”181 
The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of North Dakota 
has responded in a similar way and agrees that seeking a restitution order 
under § 2259 for an offender who possesses pornographic images of 
children is an emerging issue for North Dakota and all federal district 
courts.182  Assistant United States Attorney and Civil Chief Shon Hastings 
agrees that a restitution award under this section is proper where the 
defendant possessed pornographic images of a victim who is identifiable.183  
The United States’ Attorney’s Office for the District of North Dakota will 
begin seeking restitution awards under § 2259 in cases where the defendant 
 
175. See Walsh, supra note 1 (stating federal district court Judge Schiltz indicated the local 
U.S. attorney’s office has been mute on the issue of restitution in child pornography cases). 
176. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Federal Prosecution of 
Child Sex Exploitation Offenders (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf 
(providing sex offenses were among the fastest growing crimes handled by the federal justice 
system, and child pornography matters accounted for eighty-two percent of the growth in sex 
exploitation matters referred to U.S. attorneys from 1994 to 2006). 
177. Id. 
178. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
179. Walsh, supra note 1. 
180. See id. (stating the U.S. attorney must submit a memorandum by Jan. 29, 2010, explain-
ing why the victim is not entitled to restitution). 
181. Id. 
182. Telephone Interview with Shon Hastings, Civil Chief, U.S. Attorney’s Office, District 
of North Dakota (Jan. 22, 2010). 
183. Id. 
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has possessed pornographic images of children.184  The Department of 
Justice’s position is that restitution should be awarded where the victims are 
identifiable, and the victims should be compensated for the “full amount of 
[their] losses” in accordance with the statute.185  Restitution in child por-
nography cases is an issue that United States Attorney’s Offices around the 
nation are currently facing and will be facing more readily in the near 
future.186 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Child pornography victims not only deserve to be awarded restitution 
for the full amount of their losses, but federal law mandates this result.187  
Prosecutors need to seek restitution in all cases where child pornography 
victims are identifiable, and courts need to uphold the restitution awards 
sought by the government.188  Victims of child pornography face an uphill 
battle in life, and receiving restitution for their losses is one step in the 
healing process for them.189  Federal courts need to consider the victims and 
order defendants who possess child pornography images to pay restitution 
to the victims for the “full amount of the victim’s losses.”190 
Ashleigh B. Boe* 
 
184. Id.  The first motion for restitution order under § 2259 was filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of North Dakota on February 19, 2010.  Motion for Restitution 
Order, United States v. Scheiring, No. 3:09-CR-56 (D.N.D. 2010). 
185. Telephone Interview with Shon Hastings, supra note 182. 
186. Id. 
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1) (2010). 
188. See Walsh, supra note 1 (“The Court will no longer accept silence [ordering prosecutors 
to seek restitution for child pornography crimes].”). 
189. See discussion supra Part III.C (explaining how victims of child pornography are 
harmed by the defendants’ crimes). 
190. § 2259(3). 
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